Showing posts with label Yahoo. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Yahoo. Show all posts

Friday, 31 January 2014

Yahoo reveals coordinated attack on Yahoo Emails - encourages Password reset

On January 30, 2014, Jay Rossiter, the Senior Vice President for Yahoo's Platforms and Personalization Products shared An Important Security Update for Yahoo Mail Users on the companies Tumblr blog. In this time when "breach" is the biggest buzzword on the Internet, let's look at what the post is saying and is not saying and consider what we can learn and what we should do as a result of this information.


(click image to visit Yahoo! blogpost)

Is Yahoo a breach victim? or a champion?

(Quote): Recently, we identified a coordinated effort to gain unauthorized access to Yahoo Mail accounts.(/Quote)

While we don't know how they discovered this, the typical methods for discover would be some form of network analytics showing single IP addresses or sessions attempting to access multiple Yahoo email accounts in rapid succession, or, based on the keyword "effort", possibly attempting and failing generating a large number of password guesses. Like most Email Service Providers, Yahoo! retains records of which IP addresses have previously succeeded to access your email account, and a sudden spike in "wrong address / wrong device / wrong geography" alerts may be part of what led to the conclusion this was a coordinated effort.

While everyone is raging at Yahoo!, I believe that in this situation Yahoo! is providing a well-intentioned public service that actually reveals a pro-security stance in the company, NOT a weak security status! Read on to see why.

Password Re-Use is the Problem

Next, where did the data come from and what type of data was it?

(Quote): Based on our current findings, the list of usernames and passwords that were used to execute the attack was likely collected from a third-party database compromise. We have no evidence that they were obtained directly from Yahoo's systems.(/Quote)

On face value many are jumping to the conclusion that this indicates that Yahoo! is allowing some third party to store userids and passwords of Yahoo! users on their systems. Again, as an outsider sharing my reasoning on this event, I don't believe that is what is being said. PASSWORD RE-USE IS REACHING CRISIS LEVELS!. Oops? Did I scream that? I guess I did! The problem that I believe we are dealing with here is that many systems on the Internet ask you to use your EMAIL ADDRESS as your UserID on their system. This is a great convenience in many ways, however, in this case, it also means that a criminal now can associate your userid on one system in a very direct way to your userid on your email provider's system. MORE THAN 81 MILLION AMERICANS (and more than 200 Million people worldwide) still use a Yahoo! email account! This means that in any breach on any system where your userid is equal to your email account, there is a very great chance that the primary accounts found in that breach would be Yahoo email accounts. Despite repeated warnings, most users still use the same password on ALL of their systems. Because of this, it is logical for a criminal who obtains userids and passwords from ANY source to try those same userids and passwords at Yahoo against the matching email account.

What is the Criminals' End-Game?

(Quote): The information sought in the attack seems to be names and email addresses from the affected accounts’ most recent sent emails.(/Quote)

If someone is using the same userid and password on multiple systems, it is likely they are doing so on many ADDITIONAL systems as well. By reading the recent emails found in the Inbox and Sent mail, the criminals are likely able to determine other places where the Yahoo email user has additional accounts. For example, when I make a purchase on Amazon.com, BestBuy.com, Delta.com or pay my credit card bill at Citibank.com or BankofAmerica.com what happens? They send a confirmation of my purchase (or my statement) to my email account. If a criminal knew that information, they would be able to then try that same Yahoo email account as the userid and password and attempt to access those other accounts. In addition, how do ALL of those service confirm a password reset account? Through an email message with a "click to change your password" link. Since the criminal now has control of your Yahoo account, even if you DID use a different password, they can now reset it at will!

Of course there is also the possibility that they are just after "London traveler" type scams where knowledge of the individuals in your address book is used to send personal pleas for financial assistance due to some type of crisis. We've covered those types of scams since at least 2009 in this blog. The more recent social engineering attacks that we've heard of have been searching the compromised accounts for evidence of communications with bankers and then using the knowledge of the previous conversation to ask for financial favors or skirting of the rules to help perform a financial transaction via email.

How is Yahoo Protecting their Customers?

This is from their letter, but it is exactly what I would hope they would do after detecting this situation!

    (Quote:)
  • We are resetting passwords on impacted accounts and we are using second sign-in verification to allow users to re-secure their accounts. Impacted users will be prompted (if not, already) to change their password and may receive an email notification or an SMS text if they have added a mobile number to their account.
  • We are working with federal law enforcement to find and prosecute the perpetrators responsible for this attack.
  • We have implemented additional measures to block attacks against Yahoo’s systems.
(/QUOTE)
Jay Rossiter is also trying to help educate Yahoo! users by recommending this page of suggestions for Safeguarding your Yahoo account. Whether you are a Yahoo! user, a Gmail user, a Live.com/Outlook365 user, or whether you are just using your corporate email account, the advice given there is well worth reviewing and following.

In the Safeguarding Your Yahoo! Account document, I'd like to call special attention to their recommendation to having an alternative email and mobile phone on file with Yahoo. This isn't so they can violate your privacy. It is so they can better protect your account! I've used this service myself from Yahoo within the past two weeks and was very pleased that they texted a password reset code to my cell phone before allowing a password change request to continue.

High praise to Yahoo! for recommending that you enable a mobile-phone based password reset. I wish my banks and credit card issuers would require the same! This isn't an example of Yahoo! being a security victim, but being a security LEADER! It is shameful that my Yahoo! email account is better protected than many other accounts! (Test your own accounts: Can you click an "I Forgot My Password" link on your bank/electronics/music website to reset your password by email? )

Breaches, Phishing, It doesn't matter ... DO NOT RE-USE PASSWORDS!

At Malcovery Security we specialize in email-based Threat Intelligence. Part of that practice is having an enormous database of spam and phishing information, including nearly 700,000 confirmed phishing websites and information about each of those threats. Many of the malware samples that we report on daily through our "Today's Top Threats" report will also steal userids and passwords to accounts, including your email accounts. Almost every version of Zeus will do so, as one example. Here are a few of the Yahoo-targeted phishing scams that were popular during the previous week:

  • BT Internet Phish:

    In this long-running phishing campaign, users of Yahoo's "BTInternet.com" email domain are told that BT Broadband (formerly British Telecom) is discontinuing their email account and will replace it with a Premium Email account that they have to pay for, unless they confirm they want to keep the account by entering their email userid and password to prove they are really in control of the account.

    (This phishing screenshot was captured by Malcovery January 23, 2014 from dtinternet[.]bug3[.]com)

  • Google Docs Phish:

    Although this phish claims to be from Google Docs, this scam campaign began its life as a ReMax realty phish. In order to confirm your identity, you are asked to provide the userid and password of whichever popular email service you are using. From there the threats are similar to those described above.

    (This phishing screenshot was captured by Malcovery January 29, 2014 from www[.]thewigleygroup[.]com/googledocss/sss/)

  • GT Bank / Yahoo! Phish:

    GT Bank is Guaranty Trust Bank plc, a pan-African bank with Nigerian roots. In this example, the phishing target is actually Yahoo, but since the phish was created by someone logging in from Africa, the Yahoo! page they captured is adorned with a GTBank logo and advertisement.

    (This particular phishing screenshot was captured by Malcovery January 22, 2014 from highbeam[.]co[.]th/eart/Indezx.html)

Monday, 6 January 2014

Yahoo Malware, additional data based on Fox-IT report

This weekend on the news, or perhaps Monday morning on NPR, you heard that the popular Yahoo domain has been targeted by criminals who pushed malicious advertisements through their services to unsuspecting victims. This technique, generally known as "malvertising", works because advertisement hosters, such as Yahoo, Microsoft, and Google, run deep networks of ads that pull in third party content, which can itself pull in third party content, through many links down an increasingly untrustworthy and untraceable chain. This is nothing new, but is still concerning after at least five years worth of investigations into how to protect ad networks better.

The famous "DNS Changer" case that was featured on the FBI's website in the story Case against Internet fraud ring reveals millions unknowingly affected worldwide actually began when criminals were using such malicious ads to push Fake Antivirus malware to a variety of high profile websites, including the New York Times, which explained its own breach in this September 2009 story, Advertising - On the Web, Ads Can Be a Security Hole.

In the current Yahoo campaign, it was the excellent researchers at Fox-IT in the Netherlands who broke the news. Their story, Malicious advertisements served via Yahoo showed some key information about what was going on.

One very important difference between what you are hearing on the news and reality ... NO ONE HAD TO CLICK the ads in order to be infected. Because the ads displayed an "IFRAME" which caused a REDIRECT to be executed, simply having the ad displayed in your JavaScript aware browser was enough to cause the Exploit Kit to be visited. Over 300,000 computers per hour were visiting the Exploit kit, and roughly 11% of them, 27,000 per hour, were actually infected with malware as a result of the visit. These are very acceptable numbers in the malware distribution world. (visit and infection rates based on Fox-IT's analysis of the destination server hosted in the Netherlands.)

Basically, some of the advertisements that appeared through Yahoo's ad network contained an IFRAME. An IFRAME is an HTML command that says "go get some content from this OTHER website, and display it as part of what is being shown here." According to Fox's article, some of the domains where the IFRAMEs were hosted included:

  • blistartoncom.org (192.133.137.59), registered on 1 Jan 2014
  • slaponitkons.net (192.133.137.100), registered on 1 Jan 2014
  • origina-filmsonline.com (192.133.137.63)
  • funnyboobsonline.org (192.133.137.247)
  • yagerass.org (192.133.137.56)

Magnitude Exploit Kit

Their article also says that the IFRAME would redirect the computer to a copy of an Exploit Kit known as "Magnitude" by issuing an HTTP REDIRECT statement. You may be familiar with the most famous Exploit Kit in history, the Blackhole Exploit Kit. Back in December this blog ran a story Paunch and the Black Hole / Cool EK Exploit Kit that discussed the fact that the criminals behind that kit have finally been apprehended, and that since their arrest in October, there had been a marked decline in Exploit Kit-based infections.

During my "Malcovery Security Year in Review 2013" webinar (recording available here), one of my predictions was "Prediction #6: Malicious Email Innovators will expand into the vaccum left by Black Hole Exploit arrests". We'll be watching the Magnitude Exploit Kit to see if it can rise to that level.

One reason to believe that Magnitude may dominate this space is to look at where known cybercriminals moved their goods after the demise of BlackHole Exploit Kit. BlackHole was actually one of TWO Exploit Kits run by Paunch. The "premium" Exploit Kit was called "Cool EK" and delivered zero-day (0-day) exploits that were not publicly available anywhere else. After the zero-days became publicly disclosed, Paunch would push those exploits to the lower cost and more common BlackHole Exploit Kit. The primary buyers of the Cool EK throughout the summer were the criminals behind Reveton, which was also known as "Police Lock Ransomware".

One of the early uses of the Magnitude EK was disclosed on the website "kahusecurity", in their article Deobfuscating Magnitude Exploit Kit. The analysis shows that Magnitude was pushing very new Zero-day exploits, and more interestingly, the end-game of the infection was to install the Reveton PoliceLock Exploit Kit!


(Click image to visit the KahuSecurity report on Magnitude EK)

This is also not the first time that the Magnitude Exploit Kit has been associated with a high-profile website "drive-by infection". Our friend Fabio Assolini, of Kaspersky Security, confirmed that PHP.net, the official website of PHP, was actually injected with a malicious iframe that pointed to the Magnitude Exploit Kit and infected visitors with the Tepfer Trojan (which is better known in some circles as Papras). Here's his tweet (thanks to KahuSecurity for the link):

Other great analysis links for understanding Magnitude EK include:

Magnitude used in ADP Spam

We certainly agree with ProofPoint and Dell on their assertion that Cutwail is using Magnitude. While Reveton was a primary user of the Cool EK, the heaviest user of the BlackHole EK were the malware spammers behind Cutwail. One example of Cutwail using Magnitude would be the October 22, 2013 ADP Payroll spam campaign. In that campaign, Malcovery's T3 Report customers would have been warned of spam messages with subjects "ADP payroll: Account Charge Alert" and "ADP RUN: Account Charge Alert" where URLs on compromised WordPress sites, including cinematracks.com, campwow.com, ceo-interviews.com, and businessblogtechs.com were being used to send visitors to the Magnitude EK site abrakandabr.ru to retrieve "adp.report.php" from port 8080. Just as in this weekend's Yahoo exploit, the primary infection method was a hostile ".jar" file dropped from the Exploit Kit. On October 22, 2013, the ADP spam campaign's Magnitude server dropped the jar file we reported to VirusTotal in this report. which when last scanned was detected as hostile by 6 of 47 Antivirus vendors.

Check Your Logs for . . .

Fox-IT lists that there were several "seemingly random subdomains" on the following domains that were used in the redirection, which they list as:

  • boxsdiscussing.net
  • crisisreverse.net
  • limitingbeyond.net
  • and others

Based on some research that I've done in the Internet Identity Passive DNS Research platform, I was able to find those names ... here are some examples:


201214.yqs.lucd.ici.ptwd.ivntyzjdlzuk.boxsdiscussing.net
201211.ef.ivntyzjdlzuk.boxsdiscussing.net
201116.vbnf.mkr.ovei.zza.cgu.ivntyzjdlzuk.boxsdiscussing.net
201214.rcfg.bgy.tej.veae.juv.ivntyzjdlzuk.boxsdiscussing.net
201311.leo.dx.ivntyzjdlzuk.boxsdiscussing.net
201115.fe.srqe.sbisakxivel.boxsdiscussing.net
2018.xfi.eah.mhi.sbisakxivel.boxsdiscussing.net
201311.zn.sbisakxivel.boxsdiscussing.net
201216.ehp.sbisakxivel.boxsdiscussing.net
201216.rmji.kjm.hrp.xpex.sbisakxivel.boxsdiscussing.net
201115.obw.wx.sbisakxivel.boxsdiscussing.net
201116.bomw.tswi.vpzy.ir.kqdy.sbisakxivel.boxsdiscussing.net

201311.qw.wvtj.cb.eveourvczt.crisisreverse.net
201311.hrph.sqee.zo.eveourvczt.crisisreverse.net
201118.bfcq.eveourvczt.crisisreverse.net
201116.sp.xdq.xwgt.vqna.ms.eveourvczt.crisisreverse.net
201311.zjn.ejh.rws.hwhd.twiurmgmvw.crisisreverse.net
201116.zllf.zj.lbz.be.twiurmgmvw.crisisreverse.net
201216.udi.wke.twiurmgmvw.crisisreverse.net
201311.nez.uj.kbwc.atk.pbgu.twiurmgmvw.crisisreverse.net
201214.quqc.gm.rf.we.tg.fmpryuyqoz.crisisreverse.net
201311.mak.fmpryuyqoz.crisisreverse.net
201311.nsm.fmpryuyqoz.crisisreverse.net
201311.zm.fmpryuyqoz.crisisreverse.net
201115.ysw.fmpryuyqoz.crisisreverse.net

201115.eoju.zqlj.ze.tt.cmxf.paftwtdqc.limitingbeyond.net
201116.pg.paftwtdqc.limitingbeyond.net
201115.pz.rbnq.rwg.paftwtdqc.limitingbeyond.net
201210.xm.sym.paftwtdqc.limitingbeyond.net
201111.bao.paftwtdqc.limitingbeyond.net
201116.wi.tdc.xgx.jfuo.paftwtdqc.limitingbeyond.net
201514.pbcp.paftwtdqc.limitingbeyond.net
201214.aeo.nwfn.cbpz.efs.paftwtdqc.limitingbeyond.net
201216.yjg.ynnu.paftwtdqc.limitingbeyond.net
201210.yu.paftwtdqc.limitingbeyond.net
201116.jy.ek.tma.fuiv.paftwtdqc.limitingbeyond.net
201116.fo.hea.dyu.wqi.cnsw.paftwtdqc.limitingbeyond.net
201514.fwsj.qygk.dmd.bia.vhy.paftwtdqc.limitingbeyond.net
201214.nsnz.paftwtdqc.limitingbeyond.net
In addition to the domains listed by Fox-IT, we were able to confirm these additional domains, which all used the same hostname/subdomain patterns, and all resolved to the same IP address, 193.169.245.78.

  • boxsdiscussing.net
  • chapterwild.net
  • crisisreverse.net
  • elsecommenting.net
  • farmtrains.net
  • federalpoet.net
  • irritatedpound.net
  • layfriend.net
  • liechecks.net
  • limitingbeyond.net
  • suggestsfilm.net
One example of each of those hostname/subdomain patterns for each of those domains, all observed in the IID Passive DNS collection resolving to 193.169.245.78, are given here:

  • 201311.koha.uue.vwm.swp.cfmg.buosehgr.boxsdiscussing.net
  • 201311.et.ck.fsc.gjwa.dh.acirtcbrjmcm.chapterwild.net
  • 201116.sp.xdq.xwgt.vqna.ms.eveourvczt.crisisreverse.net
  • 201214.ups.xwo.jrw.hoy.bmm.bhzoahcvhbv.elsecommenting.net
  • 201210.kyy.qfw.qji.lg.agw.douvcaghuuh.farmtrains.net
  • 201214.lu.oqkt.vu.qfmw.xsyn.gjsjixxiskxe.federalpoet.net
  • 201116.ivfi.pmar.vv.hw.fvyg.aicnkapom.irritatedpound.net
  • 201116.gp.hnpd.lwp.nv.aj.armlnjjyot.layfriend.net
  • 201210.uzb.cavs.bqkw.kpou.cwp.blenzspz.liechecks.net
  • 201210.bigc.opt.jcov.widl.hpv.duohlqzrzqw.limitingbeyond.net
  • 201116.jjia.wo.nmf.chl.sog.gvkqjqvzf.suggestsfilm.net

Fox-IT illustrates the Infection Flow

Please visit the excellent post by Fox-IT to read their analysis, but I've borrowed their graphic from there as a better way to show the traffic flow.
(click graphic to visit original article)